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it, need not here be discussed. Enough if it serves to solve, in outline, the real dilemma of our knowledge. We can now say both that knowledge of reality, of what it means to be real, is immediate and unacquired, that the mind and real being do confront each other, but the knowledge of what it means to be real is not derived from experience. If any object experienced is known as real, it can only be because the mind first knows what "to be real" means, and, thus equipped, finds an instance, an illustration of reality in immediate experience.

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SOME MEANINGS OF THE WORD IS

IF we take the term essence to designate inalienable ideal being, of which physical or psychic existence happens to realize a part, we may contrast the sense in which being is predicated of essence with some other senses of the verb to be; for there are many.

1. The copula properly denotes identity, not merely in the obvious case of *A* is *A*, but in cases where diversity of symbols or of approach disguises the identity of the object meant, so that the discovery of this identity may be important or surprising; as when we say "This is Odysseus," or "XI is 11," or "12 is 2×6 ." It is in this sense that being is proper to essence; everything *is* what it is. Whenever for the sake of emphasis we repeat a word, saying "No, No," or "Business is business," the effect is to detach and make indubitable the essence we mean, so that attention may be fixed upon it to the exclusion of circumstances, which do not alter essences.

In such expression of identity lies the most proper and literal force of the word *is*. Hence the term essence, derived from the same root, is well fitted to designate any ideal or logical nature, anything always necessarily identical with itself. Nothing else so truly *is* as character. By having character things can become candidates for existence; without character their existence would not differ from their absence nor from the existence of something else. Even after things lose their existence, or before they attain it, their character defines and distinguishes them in eternity, so that true and false assertions may be made concerning them, such, for instance, as that they do not exist. What an essence is it is always; and in so far as a thing changes its character it embodies a different essence and, however continuous its existence or persistent its substance, is "essentially" a new thing.

2. The copula is also used, in predication, to designate some prop-

erty in what has other properties as well, in the form *A* is *B*; a formula which, if being always means identity, would be self-contradictory. Wine is wine and red is red, but red is not wine nor (in the sense of identity) can wine be red. When we say it is so, we mean "has the color red." This use of the word *is* remains ideal and relative to character only; it does not transgress the sphere of essence, logically or esthetically intuited, but it marks only a part of the essence embedded in the whole. We see in this that essences may be complex, many essences being included in one, as the essence of red wine includes the essence red, and the essence red, perhaps, the essence extension. Every quality in actual or possible objects is a fundamental and separate essence on its own account. The fact that some essences are used by us as subjects and some as attributes in describing existing things is due to the actual constitution of nature, in which some qualities happen to be deeper and more constant than others, as the mass of a body is more constant than its position. In the realm of essence every distinguishable element, and every possible system of elements, is equally primitive and indestructible.

3. The word *is*, however, has another totally different acceptation when it means *exists*. Existence adds no new character to the essence it hypostatizes, since the essence of any existing thing is its full character; but the hypostasis is temporal and caught in a mesh of natural relations (as even one part of physical space is in contrast to any other part) to which the essence hypostasized is impervious. When the word *is* designates existence it claims for the object a place in some natural context, amid external variable relations, such as the essence embodied could not possibly have in its own dialectical and eternal medium. Whether such a claim is just can never be determined by analyzing the essence of what is said to exist, but only by exploration, through experience or evidence, of the flux of nature, until the essence invoked is discovered embodied in the suggested context: for it is idle to say that a thing exists or does not exist, if we do not say when or where. Existence exhibits things in a situation and with an emphasis which their mere essence could never have had. Things generate one another, and their flux, by catching the dye now of one essence and now of another, becomes varied and describable. Something *is*, in the sense of *exists*, when it figures in this changeful and selective illustration of essences.

4. The word *is*, in a looser sense, often serves to express the substance or origin of a thing, as when we say, "This spark is a firefly, not a star." Essentially a spark is simply a spark and a light a light; but in the natural world a light may be the effect or the appearance of many different things. A sure sign of this improper naturalistic use of the word *is* may be found in the phrase, dear to so-called critical phi-

losophers, "This *is nothing but* that." Thus we hear that a house is nothing but bricks and mortar, the mind nothing but a bundle of perceptions, God nothing but a power not ourselves that makes for righteousness, the material world nothing but a permanent possibility of sensation. Such assignations of specific origins or substances to the things of daily discourse might possibly be correct physically or historically: the whole substance, the full ground of what is analyzed, might be given in such an analysis. In fact, this sort of analysis is seldom adequate; in none of the four examples I have just given, for instance, is even the substance or origin of the things in question assigned correctly. But even if it was, the essence of each of them would have been missed and left standing, and in spite of the critic would remain the very essence that it always was. Things are never merely their whole substance nor merely their whole cause; they are what they are, having an inalienable physiognomy and essence of their own. To say they *are* what they are made of or what brings them about, when this is something wholly different from them in essence, is to use the verb *to be* in a confused and confusing way, although the poverty of language may render such speech inevitable.

Whenever, then, the word *is*, though used with literary propriety, seems to cover some ambiguity or (as in the ontological proof) to lend itself to some obvious fallacy, we have but to ask whether it is used essentially, meaning "is identical with this," or attributively meaning "has this property among others," or existentially, meaning, "has a place in the flux," or naturalistically, meaning "has this substance or origin." If we substitute the last three phrases whenever they will fit, the cases in which the word *is* alone remains appropriate and sufficient will be those in which it serves to denote an essence, to give that essence a definition, or to call it by some synonym of its proper name.

GEORGE SANTAYANA.

PROFESSOR HOCKING'S ARGUMENT FROM EXPERIENCE

THE purpose of this paper is to offer a brief examination of the fourth part of Professor Hocking's book, "The Meaning of God in Human Experience." Inasmuch as this part of his book is an essay in philosophical thinking, an examination of it comes fairly within the scope of this JOURNAL.

The substance of this part of the book is an argument for the existence of God based upon our experience of nature. The unique feature of Professor Hocking's undertaking is the attempt to find God by the pathway of cognitive experience alone; and that experience of the simplest type, namely, our experience of nature. He will not